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t~N THE SUPREME CQU,RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J~A.\1 I~~ G. ~IORRISOX, 
llc.'3})(J nde u t, 
-vs.-
JOSEPH F. 1-fORNE, Director of 
Zoning and Building of Salt Lake 
County, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NA'Tl~RI~~ OF THE CASE 
Case No. 9394 
This is an appeal from the Order of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District granting a \-Vrit 
of ~Iandamus directing the Director of the Zoning and 
Building Inspeetion Departrnent of Salt Lake County 
to i~~ue a building perrnit to James G. ~Iorrison 
to allo"\v hin1 to build a service station on the X orth-
'vest corner of Seventh East and Forty-fifth South 
Street~ in Salt Lake ( 1ounty contrary to the existing 
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zoning ordinances applicable to that address. The que~­
tion presented is as to the meaning of, and the validity 
of Salt I.Jake Co11nty ordinances Title 8, ·Chapter +, as 
a1nended, effective June 1 ;)~ 1957. 
ST.A.TE~IENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not in serious conflict 
and 1nay be briefly sunnnarized as follo\YS : 
Petitioner-Respondent has an interest 1n property 
located on the K orth\\Test corner of the intersection 
of Forty-fifth South and Seventh East Streets in Salt 
Lake County, lTtah. which property 'vas first zoned 
effective date Decen1ber 6, 1953 and has ever since 
been zoned R3-A, 'vhich designation is for residential 
use only and precludes any con1n1ercial use. A structure 
suitable for a general store was upon the premises at 
the time said Ordinance beca1ne effective, 'vhich structure 
remained on the premises until it burned sometime in 
1960; that from sometime in excess of one year prior 
to the effective date of the Ordinance until the present, 
the premises have been vacant and unused. 
The evidence further sho,ved that Salt Lake County 
has assessed the property in question based upon its 
valuation as commercial property for the period 1955 
through the year 1960. 
Upon the foregoing facts, the Court issued its order 
granting the Writ of Mandamus requested by Petitioner-
Respondent and Salt Lake County has appealed there-
from. 
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Becau~e of the natur~ of the proceeding there are 
no Findings of F,act or Conclusions of Law front 'vhich 
Appellant can determine the basis of the District ·Court 
for its holding that the Writ of Mandamus should be 
issued. For this reason Appellant is obliged to anticipate 
in it~ brief all possible ju~tification for said holding 
"~ith the rp~ult that its brjpf 1nay be so1newhat longer 
than necessary· and 1nay eover areas not in serious 
dispute. On the other hand it should be noted that son1e 
guidance i~ given by I)etitioner-RPspondent 's trial brief 
filed herein. 
STATE~fENT OF POIKTS 
POINT I. 
A NON-CONFORMING USE BEING AN EXCEPTION 
TO THE ZONING ORDINANCE, THE BURDEN IS UPON 
THE PARTY ASSERTING THE RIGHT TO SAID USE TO· 
PROVE ITS EXISTENCE. THERE IS NO WHERE IN THE 
RE·CORD OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENCE OF A 
NON-CONFORMING USE EXISTING AT THE 'TIME THE 
ZONING ORDINANCE CAME INTO EXISTEN·CE. 
POINT II. 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT AT ·THE TIME OF THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE PETI-
TIONER'S PREDECESSORS HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGH'T 
TO USE THEIR PROPERTY NOT IN CONFORMANCE WTTH 
THE ZONING ORDINANCE, SUCH RIGHT CEASED TO 
EXIST PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ORDINANCE TITLE 8, CHAPTER 4, SECTION 6, 
AS AMENDED, EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1957, BECAUSE THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NO·T OCCUPIED BY A 
NONCONFORMING USE FOR A CON'TINUOUS PERIOD 
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OF ONE YEAR. IN ADDITION SAID RIGHT HAS BEEN 
ABANDONED BY PETITIONER-RESPONDENT AND/OR 
HIS PREDE·CESSORS. 
POINT III. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED, BY HAVING 
ASSESSED THE PROPER'TY IN QUESTION UPON A COM-
MERCIAL VALUATION, FROM NOW DENYING THAT IT 
CAN BE USED COMMERCIALLY FOR TWO REASONS. 
1. IT IS NOT BOUND BY THE ERRONEOUS MIN-
ISTERIAL ACTS OF AN EMPLOYEE OF 'THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE. 
2. PETITIONER-RESPONDENT CANNOT BE SAID TO 
HAVE REASONABLY RELIED ON SAID ASSESSMENT IN 
VIEW OF 'THE NOTICE OF 'THE APPLICABLE ZONING, 
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, FURNISHED BY THE 
ZONING ORDINANCE ITSELF. 
POINT IV. 
EVEN IF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED 
A RIGH·T TO USE HIS PREMISES NOT IN CONFORMANCE 
WITH THE APPLICABLE ZONING ORDINANCE, THAT 
NON-CONFORMING RIGHT IS ONLY TO USE THE PREM-
ISES AS A GENERAL STORE AND NOT AS A RETAIL 
GASOLINE STA'TION AS REQUESTED IN HIS APPLICA-
TION FOR A BUILDING PERMIT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A NON-CONFORl\fiNG USE BEING AN EXCEPTION 
TO THE ZONING ORDINANCE, THE BURDEN IS UPON 
'THE PARTY ASSERTING THE RIGHT TO SAID USE TO 
PROVE ITS EXISTENCE. THERE IS NO WHERE IN THE 
RECORD OF THESE PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENCE OF A 
NON-CONFORMING USE EXISTING AT THE 'TIME THE 
ZONING ORDINANCE CAME INTO EXISTENCE. 
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Ameriran Juris prudence broad]~~ outlines the gen0ral 
rule describing tltP part~· having the burden of proof 
at 20 An1. J ur. 1:~s, Evidence Section 135, as follows: 
dThe fundamental principle is that the bur-
den of proof in any cause rests upon the party 
\\·ho, a::-; deter1nined by the pleadings or the nature 
of thP cas0, asserts the affirmative of an issue 
and remains there until the ter1nination of the 
artion." 
This rule ha~ hPen applied to a rase involving proof 
of a non-confor1ning USP in case of J(au.sa.-,· ('ity v. lVil-
hoit, ~>~7 S\\r 2d 919~ 1\1 etzenbau1n in his ,,·ork quotes 
from that case at the top of page 1240 as follows: 
'"In prosecution for violation of a zoning 
ordinanct}, ,,·here provision that a nonconfor1ning 
use existing at the ti1ne of the passage of the 
ordinance 1night he continued, \\·as not part of 
the enacting clause of the zoning ordinance nor 
the part of the description of the offense involved 
and ih;; provisions appeared in a separate section 
of the ordinance, the defendant had the b1trden 
of proving the nonconforming use of her property 
and a continuation of such use until the dates of 
the alleged violations." 
''In prosecution for violation of zoning ord-
inance on ground that defendant \\·as using a 
private residence for boarding or lodging more 
than four persons, evidence did not establish 
the defense of a nonconforming use of the resi-
dence existing lawfully at the tinze of the passage 
of the zoning ordinance." 
This reasoning is further supported by a discussion in 
... \LR 2d entitled '"Zoning-Resuming Xonconforming Use" 
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at 18 ALI{ 2d page 728 Section 2, Subparagraph 3, 
beginning at the botto1n of the first colu1nn of page 728, 
as follows: 
~'Turning now to the effect which a discon-
tinuance of a nonconfor1ning use has on the O\\'"n-
er's right to resume such use, it appear~ to be 
'veil settled that the right of a property o'vner 
to continue a nonconforming use will be lost 
through the abandonment of such use before or 
after the adoption of the zoning ordinance and 
that compliance must thereafter be had with its 
regulations. On the other hand, actions not 
ainounting in la"'" to abandonment do not produce 
this effect, and, therefore, a te1nporary cessation 
of a nonconforming use or the temporary vacancy 
of buildings used for a nonconforming use does 
not in itself operate as an abandonment of the 
nonconforming use, where the circunzstances, con-
ditions, and statements of the owner are consist.ent 
with or evidence of .an intention not to aba~ndon 
the nonconformin-g use." (Emphasis added) 
See also, 101 CJS 940 beginning at Section 18-! on 
Zoning as follows: 
"The rule permitting a landowner to continue 
a nonconforming use of property in a certain area 
applies only to a lawful nonconforming use which 
existed at the time of promulgation of the zoning 
ordinance or regulation. Normally the critical 
date is that on 'vhich the regulation prohibiting 
the use becomes effective rather than the date 
of its passage-" 
Petitioner has asserted in his petition at paragraph 
2 thereof that : 
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·'That PPtitioner and hi~ predeees~or in inter-
est have a non-confonning com1nercial use in the 
abovP desrribed property and have had such use 
since 1941. And said property has been valued 
and taxPd a~ coHnuereial propert~Y by ~alt Lake 
(_ 
1ounty for the ~rear 1960 and for several years 
last past." 
It appears then that the burden is upon Petitioner-
RPspondent to sho\\· that he is entitled to a non-conform-
ing u~e in the instant case for other,vise he is clearly 
In violation of the applicable zoning ordinance. 
rrhe evidence in this case relevant to the use of the 
pre1nises at the ti1ne of the effective date of the ordinance 
is as follo"·s: 
The effec-tive date of the applicable ordinance 'Yas 
Deee1nher (), 1953 according to the uncontested testimony 
of the zoning inspector (R. 16line 11) 
Three ,,·itnesses testified concerning the use of the 
propt>rty in question both before and after that date. 
1lrs. lT rsenbach testified that she returned to her near-by 
residence in October 1952, and that the property in 
question \Yas vacant and unused, (R-15 Line 3) that 
the la~t time she kne\v of the property being used was 
in the spring of 19-+7 (R15 Line 24). 
:Jfr. )lorrison's testimony on this subject is as fol-
lo\vs: He testified that he had been observing the prop-
erty in question for the past four or five years and 
that it had not been used during that time (R-18 Line 21). 
He testified that he couldn't say definitely \vhen the store 
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discontinued its operation (R-:~6 Line -±) and further 
down that san1e page, testified that he has learned that 
it discontinued its operation around 1953 or 1955, and 
still later on that same page that he kne"'" the business 
was there in 1950. 
~fr. l\{iller testified that he lived in the area and 
that the store operated until 1951 or 1952 and that it 
had been vacant since that time (R-29 Line 16 and 28). 
\Vhere, as here, the building in question "\Yas not 
being used at the time of the effective date of this zon-
ing ordinance, it would appear that there not being any 
use of the property, there could not be a non-conforming 
use. The best that can be said in support of a non-con-
forming use is that if it can be sho,vn that there 'vas 
an intention to continue the last use or at the very least 
an intention not to abandon the prior use, then a non-
conforming use may be found. 
There being no evidence anywhere in the record 
concerning the intention of the owner of the prenrises 
to continue his for1ner use of the property at the time 
of the effective date of the zoning ordinance, it is sub-
mitted that Petitioner-Respondent has not sustained his 
burden to show the existence of a nonconforming use 
of the property in question. 
POINT II. 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT AT 'THE TIME OF THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE PETI-
TIONER'S PREDECESSORS HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGHT 
TO USE THEIR PROPERTY NOT IN CONFORMANCE WI'TH 
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THE ZONING ORDINANCE SUCH RIGHT CEASED TO , 
EXIST PURSUAN'T TO THE PROVISIONS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ORDINANCE TITLE 8, CHAPTER 4, SECTION 6, 
AS AMENDED, EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1957, BECAUSE THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NOT OCCUPIED BY A 
NONCONFORMING USE FOR A CON'TINUOUS PERIOD 
OF ONE YEAR. IN ADDITION SAID RIGHT HAS BEEN 
ABANDONED BY PETITIONER-RESPONDENT AND jOR 
HIS PREDE·CESSORS. 
~alt Lake County Ordinance Title 8, Chapter +, 
~Petion 6, as amended, effective J nne 15, 1957, provides 
as follows: 
HA building or structure or portion thereof 
occupied by a nonconforming use, which is, or 
hereafter becomes, vacant and remains unoccupied 
by a nonconfor1ning use for a continuous period 
of one (1) year, except for dwellings, shall not 
thereafter be occupied except by a use 'vhich con-
fornls to the use regulations of the zone in which 
it is lora ted." 
It is submitted that said language is unambiguous 
and "Then applied to the facts in the instant case, the 
only possible result is a finding that the land in < tuestion 
1nay not be occupied except by use 'vhich conforms to 
the use regulations of the zone in \vhich it is located . 
.. A.~ yet Petitioner-Respondent has not, ei thP r in his 
argument or trial brief, ~atisfactorily anS\\rered or count-
ered the provisions of this ordinance, nor has he indira ted 
that it is for any reason invalid. The only suggestion 
yet received concerning ho\\r this ordinance can be avoided 
in this case is Petitioner's argument that said ordinance 
duplicates the provisions of Salt Lake County Ordinance 
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Title 8, Chapter 4, Section 11, as amended, effective 
June 15, 1957 which provides as follows : 
• "The nonconforrning use of land, existing at 
the tiine thi~ Ti tie becarne effective, n1ay be eon-
tinned, provided that no such nonconforming use 
of land shall in any 'vay be expanded or extended 
either on the same or adjoining property, and 
provided that if such nonconforming use of land, 
or any portion thereof, is abandoned or changed 
for a period of one (1) year or more, any future 
use of such land shall be in eonfor1nity \vith the 
provisions of this Title.'' 
And that the provisions of this latter ordinanee to the 
effPct that if the use in question is abandoned then any 
future use should be in conformity 'vith the zoning ordi-
nanee somehow proscribes the operation of the former 
ordinance. 
In response to this argu1nent Appellant points out 
that a fair reading of both provisions indicates that a 
right to use land not in conforn1ance \Yith the zoning 
ordinance may be lost not only by dis-use for a period 
of one year, but additionally by abandonn1ent and addi-
tionally by a ehange of use for a period of one year. 
Although it has not been suggested that the provi-
sions of Salt Lake County Ordinance Chapter 8, Title 
4, Section 6, are invalid, because 'Ye do not kno'Y on 'Yha t 
factual or legal basis the case was decided in the lower 
Court we feel constrained to support the proposition that 
they are valid. To this end, the Court is invited to see 
a three page discussion in ~Ietzenbaun1, 'T olun1e ~. 
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pa~es 1~-+S through 19;)0 \vherPin ~I etzenbaun1 cites as 
the applieahle rulP in capital letters the holding of the 
ea~P of J1.,ranner RPalitv l 1orr). v. Lebouf 109 K\TS 2d ;):.?G 
. ' 
a~ follo,Ys : 
"AN ORDINANCE SETTING TWELVE MONTHS 
OF "DISCONTINUANCE" OF A NONCONFORMING 
USE, AS A BAR TO RESUMPTION OF SUCH USE, 
HELD REASONABLE AND ENFORCEABLE, EVEN 
THOUGH THERE BE NO EVIDENCE OF INTEND-
ED ABANDONMEN'T OF SUCH NONCONFORMING 
USE." 
Thi8 ~a1ne case is again quoted at the 1niddle of 
page 1:2-+9 in n[etzenbauln as follo,vs: 
HThis leaves one remaining query: r~ the 
ordinance, in so far as it attempts to abolish a 
nonconforming use after non-user for one year, 
valid and constitutional~" 
Hln this connection it must be borne in 1nind 
that the policy of the law is the gr.adwal elimima-
tion of non-conforming uses and, accordingly, ord-
inances should not be given an interpretation 
which would permit an indefinite continuation 
of the non-conforming use. l\IeQuillin on l\Iunic-
ipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, \:'" ol. 8, Section 
25.189 and cases cited." 
''The courts have gone far beyond holding 
that mere nonuse for a specified period of time 
may terminate the nonconforming use. In ,Stan-
dard Oil ·Co. v. C~ity of Tallahassee, 5 Cir, 1950, 
183 F2d 410, 412, certiorari denied ( 1950) in 340 
liS 892, 71 S Ct. 208." 
~~It seems well established by the decisions, 
that ordinances such as the one at bar are valid 
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and constitutional. The only question that might 
arise in each case is the reasonableness of the 
period of tinte set forth in the ordinance. ThP 
court is satisfied that the period of a year in the 
ordinance herein is a reasona!Jle onP. The actual 
period of Jl onuse herein has been five years since 
the end of the \\·ar and eight years altogether." 
As to 'vhether Petitioner-Respondent abandoned his 
right to use his property not in conformance 'vith 
the zoning ordinance (if he ever acquired it), please 
refer to our argument that it 'vas lost by abondonment 
prior to the effective date of the ordinance under Point 
I above, and the argument "'"ith respect to burden of 
proof also in Point I above, and add the additional 
ingredient of approximately seven years of nonuse from 
December 1953 to the fall of 1960 to establish the faet 
of abandonment on the part of the Petitioner-Respondent 
and his predecessors. 
POINT III. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT ESTOPPED, BY HAVING 
ASSESSED THE PROPER'TY IN QUESTION UPON A COM-
MER·CIAL VALUATION, FROM NOW DENYING THAT IT 
CAN BE USED COMMERCIALLY FOR TWO REASONS. 
1. I'T IS NOT BOUND BY THE ERRONEOUS MIN-
ISTERIAL ACTS OF AN EMPLOYEE OF ·THE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE. 
2. PETITIONER-RESPONDENT CANNOT BE SAID TO 
HAVE REASONABLY RELIED ON SAID ASSESSMENT IN 
VIEW OF 'THE NOTICE OF THE APPLICABLE ZONING, 
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, FURNISHED BY THE 
ZONING ORDINANCE ITSELF. 
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In support of its argument that Salt Lake County 
is not Pstopped to deny a building permit to Petitioner 
because of Prroneous asst•ssments by· an employee of 
the Assessor's office, see an annotation at 119 ALR 
1 fl09, an 1\nnotation at 1 ALR :Znd :-t38 Section 7, and 
~[etzenbatnn's diseussion beginning at page 162 Volun1e 
1 of his three volume work. 
Because the law seems to be reasonably clear in 
favor of municipal bodies in this area, \\re offer only 
t"ro representatives quotes from these discussions. At 
I ALR 2d 351 2nd Column, the authors of ALR say: 
"Ordinarily a municipality is not estopped by 
a rnistake, unauthorized act, laches, dereliction, or 
\\Trongful conduct on the part of a public. official, 
and no estopel can gro'v out of dealings with 
1nunicipal public officers of lirnited authority 
\\rhere sueh authority has been exceeded." 
And at page 352, bottom of first column, they add as 
follows: 
''So, as the collection of duly levied taxes 
for governmental purposes is a governmental 
function, the collection officer cannot by mistake 
or misinfor1nation \Vork an estoppel against the 
1nunicipality." 
And at 119 ALR, 1512 at the very top of the first colmnn: 
''.i\fost of the cases are to the effeet that a 
municipality is not precluded from enforcing a 
zoning or fire limit regulation by the fact that 
one or more of its officers or servants has exceed-
ed his authority by issuing a permit contraven-
ing the terms of such regulation; and this not-
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withstanding that the holder of the permit has 
proceeded thereunder to his detriment before 
the Inunicipality seeks to enforce the regulation 
again:-;t him.'' 
Even if the doctrine of estoppel was applicable in 
this casP, it cannot be said that the Petitioner-Respondent 
reasonably relied on the assessment to his detriment in 
view of the zoning ordinance itself, which gave him 
con~tru<·tive noticP that the property in question "~as 
not zoned commercially. In that regard see 101 CJS 
700, Zoning s~etion 14, \\'hich section begins as follo"\YS: 
~ • Every property owner in a city is charged 
\\·ith notice of the zoning ordinances; and even a 
nonresident \\'"ho deals ,,·ith property "\Yithin the 
limits of an unincorporated city is charged with 
knowledge of the zoning ordinance of the city 
regulating the u:-;e of such property. So, a pur-
chaser of land is presumed to possess kno,vledge 
of the restrictions in a zoning ordinance applic-
able thereto;" 
POINT IV. 
EVEN IF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED 
A RIGH·T TO USE HIS PREMISES NOT IN CONFORMANCE 
WITH THE APPLICABLE ZONING ORDINANCE, THAT 
NON-CONFORMING RIGHT IS ONLY TO USE THE PREM-
ISES AS A GENERAL STORE AND NOT AS A RETAIL 
GASOLINE STA'TION AS REQUESTED IN HIS APPLICA-
TION FOR A BUILDING PERMIT. 
Salt Lake ·Count~· Ordinance Chapter 8, Title -!, Sec-
tion 9 as an1ended, effective June 15, 1957, provides : 
"'The nonconforn1ing use of a building or 
structure 1nay not be changed except to a con-
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for1ning use: but \Yhere such ehange is n1ade, the 
u~P shall not thereafter he changed back to a 
nonconfor1ning- use." 
.[\.s in the casP of ~alt Lake L1ounty Ordinance S--!--(i, 
the languag-e of this ordinance is clear and unambiguous. 
\ \r e ha VP then onl ~r to dete r1nine if it is, for any reason, 
invalid. 
On this n1a.tter see 58 A1n. J ur., 1031, Zoning Section 
166 as follO\\rS : 
~~ '\Thether and under \V hat conditions and 
to ''That extent one nonconforming use may be 
ehanged to another depends upon a number of 
factors, including the tenns of the governing 
statute or ordinance and the view of thP courts 
or of the zoning authorities as to what constitutes 
a Hchange'' and as to whether the circun1stances 
of a particular case are such as to de1nand a 
relaxation of the strict letter of the la\v. Ordin-
arily, the exemption granted by a zoning law to 
the o\vner of land devoted to an existing noncon-
forming use is held not to confer the right to 
change from one nonconforming use to a ne\v 
and different one; the substitution of one noncon-
forming use for another is prohibited. The valid-
ity of a zoning la\v so provided or so interpreted 
has been upheld as a proper exercise of the police 
power, and the contentions rejected that the 
regulation or restriction had no real or sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare, was unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or confiscatory, and operated to take 
property \vithout due proce~s of la,v, or for a 
public use without compensation." 
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See also 18 ALR 2d, 739 Section 10, which begins : 
'~The substitution of one nonconforming use 
for another constitutes such a discontinuance of 
the original nonconforming use as to amount to 
its abandonment. Whether or not the substituted 
nonconforming use may be continued depends on 
the specific provisions of the zoning regulation 
involved." 
and 'vhich other\vise supports the statement taken from 
American Juris prudence quoted above. 
SU~I~IARY 
Appellant contends that each of its points, I, II and 
1\T are sufficient standing alone to warrant a reversal 
of the ruling of the district court. If we may be permitted 
some liberty with the language we can state our position 
as follows: 
First: That there is no nonconforming use. Second: 
If there 'vas one, it has been lost by nonuse. Third: If 
it hasn't been lost it c.annot be ehanged to a service 
station. Our Point III, of course, ha8 application to 
our right to assert Points I and II. 
\Y e ask that the ruling of the district court be 
reversed and furthPr that if the court agreP:s 'vith 
AppPllant that it ean be reVt'r~ed on the grounds urged 
in our point 1 I, that the courts' ruling be based on that 
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point to the end that Salt Lake ( 1 ount~· \viii have a 
~tandard capable of rea~onably aeeurat(~ 1neasure1nent to 
apply in its future efforts to enforce it:s zoning ordin-
anePs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
Civil Division 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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